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The sense of agency is an intriguing aspect of human consciousness and is commonly
defined as the sense that one is the author of their own actions and their consequences.
In the current study, we varied the number of action alternatives (one, three, seven) that
participants could select from and determined the effects on intentional binding which
is believed to index the low-level sense of agency. Participants made self-paced button
presses while viewing a conventional Libet clock and reported the perceived onset time of
either the button presses or consequent auditory tones. We found that the binding effect
was strongest when participants had the maximum number of alternatives, intermediate
when they had medium level of action choice and lowest when they had no choice. We
interpret our results in relation to the potential link between agency and the freedom to
choose one’s actions.
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INTRODUCTION
The sense of agency is one of the most pervasive aspects of human
consciousness and is commonly defined as the sense that one is
author of their own actions and sensory consequences (Haggard
and Tsakiris, 2009). Although a full understanding of how we
experience the sense of agency remains elusive, research con-
ducted in the last decade has been fruitful in providing the basis
for greater insight into agentic experience and the processes that
might produce it. At the conceptual level, two competing views
emphasizing predictive and retroactive processes, respectively, are
slowly being reconciled into a unified framework within which
to the study the sense of agency (see Moore and Obhi, 2012).
Despite this progress, numerous questions about the neurocog-
nitive architecture underlying agency and the type and variety of
factors that affect agency, remain.
It has previously been suggested that the subjective experience
of agency occurs at both first order (pre-reflective) and higher
order (reflective) levels of processing (Bayne and Pacherie, 2007;
Gallagher, 2007, 2010; Synofzik et al., 2008a,b; Obhi and Hall,
2011a,b). The distinction between different forms of agentic
experience leads to the question of whether the sense of agency
originates at the lower level of sensorimotor operations or at a
higher level involving interpretive mechanisms. In this respect,
two major accounts have been proposed to explain the origins of
the sense of agency. The predictive account underlines the role of
intrinsic and sensorimotor cues, whereas the inferential account
posits the contribution of extrinsic cues and high level inferences
(Wegner and Wheatley, 1999; Frith et al., 2000; Blakemore et al.,
2002; Wegner, 2002, 2003; Frith, 2005; Sato and Yasuda, 2005;
Gallagher, 2007).
Many experiments investigating the neurocognitive basis of
agentic experience have used explicit judgments as dependent
measures of the sense of agency. Such explicit measuresmost com-
monly require participants to state how much control they felt
over action outcomes (e.g., Sato and Yasuda, 2005; Balslev et al.,
2007; Linser and Goschke, 2007;Metcalfe and Greene, 2007; Ebert
and Wegner, 2010; Wenke et al., 2010) or the actions themselves
(e.g., Wegner et al., 2004; Sebanz and Lackner, 2007). In some
cases participants are asked to make direct judgments about the
cause or source of an effect in contexts where source ambiguity
is present (i.e., confederate, computer, or participant themselves
could have caused the effect; e.g., Wegner and Wheatley, 1999;
Aarts et al., 2005, 2009; Dijksterhuis et al., 2008; Spengler et al.,
2009; Obhi and Hall, 2011a,b).
However, applying only such explicit measures is highly
prone to contamination by issues such as social desirability,
impression management and the limits of introspection on the
part of participants (Metcalfe and Greene, 2007; Schüür and
Haggard, 2011; Obhi, 2012). Alternatively, other experiments
have employed “intentional binding” as a potentially implicit
measure of the sense of agency. The intentional binding effect
refers to the temporal attraction between the perceived times of
actions and effects observed in voluntary actions (e.g., Haggard
et al., 2002; Haggard and Clark, 2003; Haggard et al., 2009; Moore
et al., 2009; Strother and Obhi, 2009; Strother et al., 2010). Since
it was first introduced, intentional binding has sparked great
interest, due to its purported link relationship to the sense of
agency (see Moore and Haggard, 2010; Moore and Obhi, 2012).
Although the quest to fully unveil this relationship requires
extensive investigation, the progress made by the recent research
has been promising (for a recent review of intentional binding
research, Moore and Obhi, 2012).
To move closer to understanding the potential relationship
between binding and the sense of agency, one approach is to inves-
tigate factors that could feasibly be related to agency and assess
whether they affect intentional binding. If such factors do indeed
affect binding, it would lend support to the notion that binding
and agency are indeed linked in some, albeit complex, way.
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Agency and freedom are often considered to be tightly inter-
twined. That is, agency is thought to be strongest in an “environ-
ment of opportunities” (Pettit, 2001). Indeed, if a person cannot
freely choose a course of action, the very notion that they are
an autonomous agent is undermined. Given this, it might be
expected that agency and freedom are related such that increasing
levels of freedom to choose a course of action correspond to
increasing levels of agency. In their study, for example, Wenke
et al. (2010) assessed the feeling of control over action outcomes
when the proportion of cued and free trials (25% vs. 75%) and
the compatibility between two different subliminal action primes
and responses were manipulated. In the cued trials participants
were required to perform the cued action where in the free trials
they could freely choose one of two actions. The results showed
that participants’ feeling of control was greater when the primes
were compatible with the action responses, suggesting the effect
of facilitating the action selection processes. Of more interest, the
control ratings were higher when the proportion of free trials was
high (75/25 ratio). This study suggests an intriguing link between
one’s freedom to choose an action and their feeling of control over
the consequences of their action.
By extension and reducing the general idea of a link between
freedom and agency to a testable laboratory task, intentional
binding might also be expected to vary with differences in the
degree of freedom. Again, agency and freedom are often talked
about together and the feeling of freedom has been linked to
choice (e.g., Markus and Schwartz, 2010). In this light it is inter-
esting to note that most previous intentional binding experiments
have required participants to make a pre-specified action which
is followed by a sensory event such as an auditory tone. In such
cases, the participant is free to select when to make an action, but
is not free to select which action to make. By simply changing the
number of action alternatives that are available to participants,
it is possible to parametrically manipulate the “environment of
opportunities” (i.e., choice) and thus ascertain the effect that the
number of choice alternatives has on intentional binding. The
fundamental question is, do more action alternatives produce
greater levels of intentional binding than a more constrained
choice set, where the agent is less involved in selecting which
action to make?
To this end, in the present study we examined how agency as
purportedly indexed by intentional binding, is affected when the
number of action alternatives is manipulated. To our knowledge,
this is the first study that addresses the potential relationship
between freedomof action choice and the sense of agency. Accord-
ingly, in the present study participants were requested to make
a key press on a seven-button response pad while watching a
conventional Libet clock on the screen. They reported their per-
ceived times of key press or the auditory tone that was produced
by their key press. In the no choice condition, they were told
to press only one specific button on the response pad. In the
medium-choice condition, they were free to choose among three
buttons and in the high-choice condition they were allowed to
press any of the seven buttons. For reports of the timing of actions
and effects, we employed a similar paradigm to that of Libet
et al. (1983) (see also Haggard et al., 2002; Obhi et al., 2007,
2009).
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-four right handed participants (18 women; age range =
17–22) took part in the study. All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and received partial course credits
for their participation. The study was approved by the Research
Ethics Board of Wilfrid Laurier University and all participants
gave written informed consent prior to beginning the study. One
participant’s data was not included in the analyses due to not
following the experimental instructions.
APPARATUS AND PROCEDURE
The experiment was programmed in Superlab 4.5 (Cedrus
Corporation, USA) and ran on a Dell personal computer
(3.07 GHz). The stimuli were presented on a 20 inch monitor
(1600 × 1200). Participants sat approximately 60 cm away
from the computer monitor and the responses were recorded
on a laptop by the experimenter. The experiment consisted of
baseline and operant conditions in which the number of keys
to press (high: 7, medium: 3, no choice: 1) and the critical
event (key press, tone) that participants judged the timing were
manipulated. Similar to Haggard et al. (2002) study, the baseline
condition consisted of single events with either the key presses
or the auditory tones. The key press single event condition
included seven (high level of choice condition), three (medium
level of choice condition) and one (no choice condition) key
press choices. In the no choice condition, participants could only
press the blue button centrally placed on the response pad. In
the medium level of choice condition, they were told to choose
one of the three buttons on the right side of the response pad.
In the high level of choice condition, participants were free to
choose any of the seven buttons on the response pad. When
the critical event was the auditory tone, participants did not
make any key press but only reported the time when they heard
the tone. In the operant conditions, participants’ key press was
followed by a 1000 Hz tone (duration: 100 ms, bit rate: 160 Kbps)
presented after a delay of 200 ms and they were asked to report
the time of either their key press or the tone. The condition (2:
baseline, operant) together with the level of action choices (3:
High, Medium, No choice) and the critical event (2: Key press,
Tone) in total were tested in ten separate blocks with 30 trials
each (see Table 1 for a list of different block types). The order of
the blocks was randomized across participants. At the beginning
of each block, participants were informed which key or keys
they were allowed to press and which of the two events’ timing
(key press or the tone) they were going to report. Participants
completed six practice trials prior to the beginning of each block.
Sixty practice trials in total thus were excluded from the data
analysis.
Each trial began with a warning signal noting that a new trial
will begin, which remained on the screen for 1 s. The fixation
cross was then presented for 500ms and followed by the display of
the Libet clock (1.8 cm in diameter) with a minute hand pointing
to one of 12 positions marked at 5-minute intervals. Participants
were told to report their judgments between 0 (12 O’clock posi-
tion) and 59, including the intermediate values. The minute hand
remained stationary at the center of the screen for 500 ms and
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Table 1 | Mean judgment errors in each condition.
Level of Choice Individual
Event
Mean
Judgment Error
SD
No Choice Key press alone −35.96 67.85
Key* tone −12.68 81.19
Key tone* −106.12 135.21
Medium Key press alone −19.24 83.33
Key* tone −13.21 63.10
Key tone* −141.55 114.60
High Key press alone −58.19 62.18
Key* tone −11.34 83.65
Key tone* −137.73 143.22
Tone alone −117.44 97.56
For each event and each condition, perceived times were subtracted from the
actual time of the corresponding events.
*Indicates which event was reported in terms of its timing in the operant
condition.
then started rotating clockwise at a 2.5 s period. In the baseline—
where the single event was the key press only—and in the operant
conditions, participants were told to make the key press at their
own pace using their right index finger after the clock started
rotating. They were instructed not to give stereotyped responses
in the high and medium level of choice conditions and not to
press the key at predetermined minute hand positions. In the
baseline tone-only condition, participants did not make any key
press but reported the onset of the tone occurred at a random
time (jittered between 200 and 2000 ms) after the clock hand
rotation started. The clock continued rotating for about 2000 ms
after the participants reported the timing of the critical event.
The perceptual times were verbally reported as minute hand
positions and recorded by the experimenter on a laptop. At the
end of the experiment, participants were debriefed and thanked
for their participation in the study (see Figure 1 for a sample trial
procedure).
RESULTS
The experiment comprised a 2 (Condition: Baseline, Operant)
× 3 (Level of choice: High, Medium, No choice) × 2 (Critical
Event: Action, Tone) repeated measures design. After converting
the clock hand judgments to time values in milliseconds, we
calculated the judgment errors for each condition as the difference
between perceived and actual times of events (Table 1). Trials
with key press response time shorter than or equal to 500 ms
and with judgment errors three standard deviations away from
participant’s average judgment error were excluded from the
analysis. In addition, trials in which participants made a key press
other than the permitted ones were removed from the data. The
exclusion criteria resulted in the removal of 3.06% of all trials
(range: 1–11%).
We then obtained the perceptual shifts in terms of the dif-
ference between judgment errors between operant and the cor-
responding single event baseline conditions for both key press
and tone judgments. For example, the perceptual shift for the
high level action choice condition was calculated as the difference
between the judgment errors in the operant-high-level condition
from the baseline-high-level condition. Similarly, the perceptual
shifts for the tone judgments were calculated as the difference
between the judgment errors in each choice level-tone judg-
ment condition and baseline-tone only condition. The positive
shifts in the key press judgments and the negative shifts in the
tone judgments relative to the corresponding baseline conditions
demonstrate the temporal attraction, i.e., the intentional binding
effect, between actions and effects (Figure 2).
We ran a 3 (Level of choice: High, Medium, No choice) ×
2 (Critical event: Key press, Tone) repeated measures ANOVA to
examine the effect of having different number of action choices
on the perceptual shifts. The analysis revealed a significant main
effect of key press choice (F(2,44) = 3.359, p < .05) and a
significant main effect of critical event (F(1,22)= 5.148, p< .05).
The interaction between these factors was also significant (F(2,44)
= 3.389, p < .05). We predicted that binding would be least for
the no choice condition, strongest for the high level of choice
condition and intermediate for the medium level condition. We
thus conducted one-tailed Paired Samples t tests to examine the
2-way interaction in more detail.
The t tests performed on the perceived times of actions
revealed that when participants had high number of choices
among which keys they could press, their perceptual shift in key
press judgments from baseline condition was moved significantly
further toward the tone compared to when they had medium
level of choices (t(22) = 2.287, p < .05) and to when they had
no choice (t(22) = 1.792, p < .05). The difference between
medium level of choice condition and no choice condition was
not significant (p> .05).
With respect to the tone judgments, the perceptual shifts
moved toward the perceived action onsets for both medium and
high levels of choices. The size of the shift was greater for the
medium level than the high level and it was in the opposite direc-
tion for the no choice condition.We found a significant difference
in the perceptual shifts between high level of choice and no choice
conditions (t(22) = −2.186, p < .05) and also between medium
level of choice and no choice conditions (t(22) = −2.260, p <
.05). The difference in the perceptual shifts between high and
medium level of choices was not significant (p> .05).
We sought further the effect of choice levels on the mean
overall binding by calculating the absolute value of subtraction
of the mean key press shift in each condition from the tone shift
(Wenke et al., 2009). We conducted a 3 (Level of choice: High,
Medium, No choice) repeated measures ANOVA and found a
significant main effect of action choice level on overall binding
(F(2,44) = 3.389, p < .05). As expected, we found that overall
binding was strongest in the high level of action choice condition,
intermediate for the medium level of choice condition and lowest
for the no choice condition (Figure 3). We ran one-tailed t tests
to examine the differences across the three choice levels. The
results showed that overall binding in the high level of choice
condition was significantly greater compared to no choice (t(22)
= 1.998, p < .05) condition. However, the difference between
high level of choice and medium level of choice condition as well
as the difference between medium level of choice and no choice
conditions were not significant (p > .05).
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FIGURE 1 | Trial procedure in the operant condition. Each trial began
with a fixation cross displayed for 500 ms, participants then made a key
press at their own pace after the clock started rotating. They were told
to press a specific button in the no-choice condition or select one of
three (medium level of choice) or seven (high level of choice) buttons
on the response pad. The key press was followed by the auditory tone
after a delay of 200 ms. In the baseline condition, participants either
made a key press without hearing the tone and judged the timing of
their key press, or heard the tone which occurred alone and judged the
timing of the tone.
DISCUSSION
Previous research focusing on different forms of the sense of
agency has examined the contribution of various factors including
predictive and retrospective processes (seeMoore and Obhi, 2012,
for a full review of these studies). Action selection is a crucial
aspect of the agentic experience and has been shown to enhance
the explicit feeling of control when facilitated by the subliminal
priming of action alternatives (Wenke et al., 2010). The goal
of the present study was to examine how intentional binding
would be influenced by different levels of action choice. This is
an important question given popular notions about how freedom
and agency are intertwined (e.g., Pettit, 2001).
We measured the perceived times of individual key press and
tone events separately in both baseline and operant conditions
which allowed us to compare the size of the perceptual shift
between each level of action choice. First, we found that perceived
times of key presses for all levels of choices were shifted forward in
time. In the medium level and high level conditions, the direction
of the perceived time of the tones was shifted toward the key
press whereas, somewhat surprisingly, this was not the case for
the no-choice condition. Importantly though, as Figure 2 shows,
the overall shift for each individual event (i.e., key press and
tone) were in the right direction and demonstrate the intentional
binding effect. Of more interest, we found that the degree of
overall binding was greatest when participants had the highest
level of action alternatives to choose from. In the medium choice
condition, binding was not significantly different from the no
choice condition, but both these conditions displayed less binding
than the high choice condition. Moreover, the magnitude of
the binding in three conditions displayed a parametric trend
increasing from none to three and seven alternatives (Figure 3).
Thus, our results provide support for the notion that a high degree
of choice is associated with greater action-effect binding than
lower degrees of choice. These results serve to connect the sense
of agency to free-choice and are also consistent with the common
societal notion that the exercise of personal choice, freedom and
agency are intimately intertwined (Hirschmann, 2003; Krause,
2012).
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FIGURE 2 | Mean perceptual shift (difference between the judgment
errors in the operant and baseline conditions) for key press (lower) and
tone (upper) judgments. Error bars represent SEM (*indicates that the
perceptual shift for key presses in the high level of choice condition was
significantly greater than the medium level of choice and no choice
conditions, p < .05. The difference between medium level of choice and no
choice conditions was not significant, p > .05. **Indicates that the
perceptual shift for the tone judgments in the high level of choice and the
medium level of conditions were significantly greater than no choice
condition, p < .05. The difference between high and medium levels of
choice was not significant, p > .05).
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FIGURE 3 | Mean overall binding as a function of action choice. Error
bars represent SEM (*indicates that binding is significantly greater in the
high level of choice condition than in the no choice condition, p < .05).
What could be driving our observed effects of choice on
intentional binding and by extension, the sense of agency? Given
that all possible actions in the set of alternatives produced the
same auditory event, our method could be construed as a true
test of action selection on the sense of agency. That is, there
is no obvious reason why an individual participant may have
chosen one action over another, given that the outcome, or reward
value of each possible action was fixed. Several explanations are
possible.
First, the results we report here are consistent with the finding
that intentional binding is stronger when participants specify
both the “what” and the “when” component of a pending action,
compared to when they specify just one of these dimensions
(i.e., “when” or “what”—Brass and Haggard, 2008; Wenke et al.,
2009). Participants in the present study were always responsible
for specifying the “when” component, but had varying levels of
choice about “what” action to make. Specifically, participants
were constrained to just one possible action (no choice con-
dition), three possible actions (medium choice condition) or
seven possible actions (high choice condition). Thus, in the no
choice condition, the action is completely specified externally by
the experimenter whereas in both the medium and high choice
conditions, the participant must internally specify which action
they will ultimately select. By some accounts, the no choice
condition can be thought of as more externally triggered than
the medium and high choice conditions (see Obhi and Haggard,
2004; Schüür and Haggard, 2011; Obhi, 2012; Schüür and Hag-
gard, 2012). Correspondingly, it has been shown that activation
in areas associated with voluntary preparation to act, such as the
supplementary motor area (SMA) is greater for actions that are
more internally specified than externally specified (Jahanshahi
et al., 1995). Thus one broad explanation for our findings is that
more internal, endogenous processing prior to action production
is linked to higher levels of agency experience, which manifests as
greater intentional binding.
Another interesting framework within which to consider our
results is based on the affordance competition hypothesis that
models behavior as resulting from competition between different
representations of potential actions (Cisek, 2007). In this model,
action representations are thought of as distributed neural pop-
ulations that are activated via selective attentional mechanisms
(Tipper et al., 1992). By such a view, the action that is finally
selected and executed is chosen based on a dynamic reciprocal
process operating largely within fronto-parietal circuits which
involves mutual inhibition between potential action representa-
tions and is subject to biasing by excitatory inputs, some of which
arise from cognitive decision making processes (see Cisek, 2007,
for a detailed discussion).
Within this framework, we suggest that high, medium and no
choice conditions differ in the degree of this dynamic activation
and inhibition process that is ultimately responsible for action
selection. Specifically, the no-choice condition may not involve
the same degree of this dynamic inhibitory and excitatory activity
as the high choice condition.We suggest that this difference might
result in stronger activation of the representation of the action
selected among many, such as in the high choice condition of the
present experiment.
This is akin to more endogenous processing being linked to
greater agency, as suggested above, with the endogenous activity
being specifically the dynamic interplay between excitatory and
inhibitory processes during action selection. This explanation
also predicts greater binding for the medium choice condition
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compared to the no choice condition as reported in our study,
although the difference was not significant. From the present
study, it appears that when seven alternative actions are available,
this is sufficient to change the subjective experience of actions
compared to when there is no alternative. However three alter-
natives demonstrate no difference from seven or no alternatives.
Clearly, more work is required to determine if this suggestion is
tenable, but at the very least, our data do indicate that high choice
affects binding in a way that no choice does not.
Onemight argue that the cognitive load varied across three lev-
els of action choices in our study, which could have contaminated
our results. However, as previous studies discussed this concern
in detail, (e.g., Haggard et al., 2002) the errors in time judgments
in the operant condition are subtracted from their corresponding
baseline conditions (e.g., high level of choice action judgment
errors in the baseline condition are subtracted from high level
of choice action judgment errors in the operant condition) to
calculate the perceptual shifts for each event and condition. Since
the potential effect of either cognitive or attentional requirements
varying across different levels of choice should be present in both
baseline and operant conditions, this effect would diminish as a
result of the subtraction we used to obtain the perceptual shifts.
We thus feel confident in ruling out the effect of differential
cognitive load across conditions.
Having demonstrated that a high degree of choice is linked
to increased binding, it is important to consider that there are
limitations to the present study. For example, we did not assess the
explicit sense of agency in this study and so cannot speak to how
the number of action choice alternatives might affect the explicit
feeling of agency. In addition, we did not manipulate the outcome
of the different action alternatives. This is an obvious extension of
the current work and would allow for determining the influence
of reward on intentional binding and the sense of agency.
Despite these limitations, showing that intentional binding
is influenced by the degree of action choice is an important
finding and we believe the current study provides a new set of
questions relating to how choice affects the sense of agency, which
could apply to many domains that extend beyond a fundamental
consideration of how the sense of agency arises.
Finally, the current results, along with other recent results from
our and other labs, bolster the notion that intentional binding
is linked, in some complex way to agentic experience. Specifi-
cally, we have previously shown that priming low power reduces
binding and activating memories of depression reduces binding,
whereas others have shown that less versus more control of an
aircraft, when control is shared with an automatic pilot, reduces
binding (Berberian et al., 2012; Obhi et al., 2012a,b). Given that
these scenarios are all accompanied by real changes in the degree
of control that an individual either perceives themselves as having,
or actually has, the idea that binding and agency are linked is
strengthened. The key is for future work to understand why
and precisely how the sense of agency and binding are affected
by these kinds of manipulations. For now though, the current
results reinforce the suggestion that increased personal choice
increases agency which could form the foundation for a sense of
freedom.
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